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Abstract 
Although there have been remarkable technological developments in health-
care, the privacy and security of mobile health systems (mHealth) still raise 
many concerns with considerable consequences for patients using these 
technologies. For instance, potential security and privacy threats in wireless 
devices, such as Wi-Fi and Bluetooth connected to a patient hub at the appli-
cation, middleware and sensory layers, may result in the disclosure of private 
and sensitive data. This paper explores the security and privacy of the patient 
hub, including patient applications and their connections to sensors and 
cloud technology. Addressing the privacy and security concerns of the patient 
hub called for a comprehensive risk assessment by using the OCTAVE risk 
assessment framework. Findings reveal that the highest risk concerned 
d at a  exposure at the sensory layer. In spite of the countermeasures presented 
in this paper, most served as a means to identify risk early as opposed to 
mitigating them. The findings can serve to inform users  of the potential vul-
nerabilities in the patient hub before they arise. 
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1. Introduction 
The rapid increase in technology users, particularly personal computers and 
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mobile devices has called for more robust network security systems [1]. This has 
raised many concerns regarding the potential vulnerabilities and threats that can 
disclose a user’s or organisations sensitive data [2]. With respect to healthcare, 
restrictions on patient privacy in healthcare organisations (HCOs) become a 
greater risk [3] owing to the introduction of healthcare devices that are supposed 
to facilitate patient care and recovery. Given that potential network attacks have 
a greater impact on healthcare devices, such as sensors and patient applications, 
such technology can limit patients’ ability to communicate their doctors and 
nurses. Therefore, mobile health systems (mHealth) play a key role in the ways 
of managing users’ personal data, but at the same time, there are potential 
threats and vulnerabilities from Bluetooth and Wi-Fi technology that can ma-
nipulate mHealth systems to become a hindrance as opposed to a facilitator [4]. 
However, data security is a broad area comprising of many factors, such as au-
thorisation, authentication, and surveillance with the intention of maintaining 
accountability, authenticity, availability, and integrity of online and mobile 
technologies [5].  
Research Problem 
Effective information security systems can protect a network by adhering to its 
intended purpose and take the necessary precautions to ensure the protection of 
private the sensitive data held by users and organisations. It is only then the 
needs of mHealth systems can be met through robust network security [6]. For 
example, traditional network protection like firewalls and encryption applica-
tions are insufficient to meet the security needs of organisations [7]. Conse-
quently, there is a need to develop new architectures and tools to safeguard mo-
bile computing applications and the wireless networks they rely upon [8].  
For mHealth systems, there are three network layers that impact mHealth 
systems. These layers are the application layer, middleware layer and sensory 
layer [3]. While the application layer manages web applications hosted on the 
network, the middleware layer manages networking communication and the 
sensory layer manages wireless communication. One such wireless technology 
that utilises these three layers is known as the “patient hub”. The patient hub is 
an integrated care platform that relies on wearable sensors [9] and smart cloud 
computing technology [10] [11] [12] [13] to support patients with Chronic Ob-
structive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) and co-morbidities, with specific emphasis 
on Chronic Heart Failure, Diabetes, Anxiety and Depression. However, the ma-
nipulation of the patient hub applications and disclosure of sensitive data 
through potential network attacks could be fatal for patients relying on these 
technologies.  
Network security threats take many shapes, such as viruses, malware and 
spyware, in addition to other custom attacks from hackers. This raises a serious 
issue for mHealth systems that must be addressed for the sake of not only pro-
tecting patients’ data, but also their lives. Given the great reliance of mHealth 
systems to support patient care, this calls for an assessment of security systems 
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and networks. It is imperative to first identify the common threats to modern 
network infrastructures in mHealth system and to then determine how these 
threats can be mitigated. The patient hub as a contextual example is to assess the 
vulnerabilities in the hub’s network. For that reason, this paper explores the 
vulnerabilities of modern networks that mHealth systems depend on, specifically 
the patient hub by conducting a thorough risk assessment to identify and miti-
gate potential security threats at the application, middleware and sensory layers. 
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1. IoT in Healthcare 
In 1999, Kevin Ashton developed the term “Internet of Things” (IoT) to describe 
a unique group of interoperable objects that connect with each other using ra-
dio-frequency identification (RFID) technology [14]. Today, IoT enables the 
internet to connect to sensors which are connected with various wireless devices, 
with the majority relying on IP-based communications. For mHealth systems, 
IoT offers efficient medical treatment for patients, whilst providing early pre-
vention and remote monitoring. Here, individuals or objects are equipped with 
sensors, actuators, and Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) tags in order to 
facilitate the access by patients’ caregivers. In particular, Kaul [15] stated that 
patients’ RFID tags or medical devices can be identified, read, localised and con-
trolled by IoT applications. This gives IoT technology the opportunity to tackle 
the potential challenges that face the healthcare system [16]. 
There are several layers in the IoT architecture, starting from the technology 
layer at the bottom to the application layer at the top. The responsibility of the 
bottom layers is data capturing, while the top layers manage application data and 
usage [17]. Since this paper focuses on the patient hub, emphasis is placed on the 
three main layers: application layer, middleware layer and sensory layer.  
The application layer supports a number of IoT applications via two sub-layers 
[18]. The first sub layer is data management, which offers services ranging from 
Quality of Service (QoS) and cloud-computing technologies to data processing 
and machine-to-machine (M2M) services. The second sub-layer is application 
service, which is responsible for interfacing to end users and applications that 
run on the top IoT application layer. The middleware later is a software platform 
that provides networking communication services, ranging from access control 
and data filtering to device discovery and semantic data analysis. The sensory 
layer supports all wireless communication, including data encryption and signal 
detection [3]. Patient IoT applications rely on the sensory layer to gather and 
analyse large amounts of health data.  
Wireless connectivity provides endless flexibility to mHealth devices con-
nected to the organisational hub as a means to communicate with sensors, cloud 
services and other mobile gateways in addition to healthcare providers [19]. 
Google Health services, for example, is a mHealth device that can be used to in-
teract with remote users. Mobile sensors connected to the organisational hub has 
the ability to communicate with a mobile gateway e.g. smartphones among other 
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sensors [20], which can communicate remotely with other remote services for 
the purpose of storing healthcare data on a cloud platform, monitoring patients’ 
vital signs and health conditions in the event of an emergency and archiving 
healthcare data in a database. 
A benefit of transferring data to the organisational hub using mobile sensors 
is the minimal amount of manual data entry required to complete the data entry 
process, thus minimising cost, human error and ultimately increase system reli-
ability. Despite the potentially reliable nature of wireless communication in 
mHealth devices, they can simultaneously create numerous challenges, such as 
high risk of system attacks and vulnerabilities associated with data security and 
privacy [21]. Some of the well-known privacy concerns for users of IoT applica-
tions stem from cyber-attacks, eavesdropping, data confidentiality, location pri-
vacy, disclosure of privacy and threats to data storage [3] [22]. The most signifi-
cant types of security threats affecting mHealth systems are explained below. 
2.2. Security Threats & Attacks 
A number of studies have categorised network security threats where four dif-
ferent groups have been identified: structured threats, unstructured threats, in-
ternal threats and external threats [19] [23] [24] [25]. 
Structured threats refer to threats that are associated with highly experienced 
and proficient hackers. Attackers use sophisticated hacking tools to penetrate 
networks, such as masking and key logging techniques that are able to break 
though secure networks and exploit anything stored on that network. Unstruc-
tured threats are often performed by amateur or inexperienced hackers who will 
attempts to exploit the network [26]. Unstructured attackers will therefore resort 
to hacking tools such as shell scripts and password crackers. On reflection, 
structured threats will incur a high risk compared to unstructured owing to the 
attacker’s experience and the nature of the tools used [27]. Despite the nature of 
both types of attacks, by no means should one be treated differently or under es-
timated as they both could potentially place harm on a network infrastructure. 
External threats refer to threats performed by individuals who are unauthor-
ised to access the organisational hub and will use the internet as a tool to attempt 
to break through the network. These types of threats can be performed either by 
experienced or inexperienced hackers. Internal threats can be performed by in-
dividuals who already have access to the organisational hub. Similar to external 
threats, the extent of the damage caused by an attacker depends on the attacker’s 
level of expertise [28]. Despite the nature of the different network security 
threats, they all have a common ground when it comes to the different attacks 
facing a given network e.g. device communication attacks, reconnaissance at-
tacks, resource depletion attacks, replay attacks and external device mis-bonding 
attacks. Owing to the comprehensive nature of these types of attacks that cannot 
be fully captured in this paper, as well as the explicit focus on the three main se-
curity layers, Table 1 summarises these attacks in order to add some context to 
the nature of network security threats in the organisational hub. 
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Table 1. Types of attacks in mHealth systems & impacts on the network layers [19] [23] 
[24] [25]. 
Attack Type Description Layer Affected 
Device 
Communication Attacks 
Highly proficient attacks performed 
by experienced hackers who have the 
ability to create their own structured 
attacks, which target communication 
protocols in mHealth devices. 
Application layer 
Middle-ware layer 
Reconnaissance Attacks 
Administrators can easily overlook these 
types of attacks owing to the specific 
form this particular attack takes when 
penetrating the network. 
Reconnaissance attacks make noises 
that are commonly heard, thus making 
them difficult to detect. Attacks are  
often performed by hackers for the 
purpose of acquiring information and 
then launching a denial of service attack to 
cover any trace of the attack. 
Sensory layer 
Resource Depletion (RD) 
Attacks 
RD attacks dissipate resources of 
mHealth devices e.g. storage, battery 
and bandwidth. For example, an insulin 
pump depends on the wireless glucose 
sensor to give an accurate dose of 
insulin to a diabetes patient, and if these 
devices were attacked, it could be fatal 
for patients as attackers could regulate 
the administration of insulin. 
Middle-ware layer 
Replay Attacks 
Attackers use replay attacks to manipulate 
sensor readings to force users to make 
wrong decisions. For example, hackers 
can exploit the communication of the 
sensor that shows a high glucose level was 
administered to patient according to 
supplementary knowledge regarding the 
victim, but later the attack could 
retransmit the information that pretends 
to be accurate information. High 
administration may show up on the  
system, but in reality, the patient may  
have never been administered their insulin. 
Sensory layer 
External Device 
Mis-Bonding (DMB) 
Attacks 
DMB attacks target the mobile gateway 
running the device platform. The platform 
is connected to smartphones on a network 
channel via Bluetooth or Wi-Fi. As a result, 
any application that is able to access the 
platform via the communication channel 
could masquerade as an insider that can 
steal private information. This can be 
detrimental for patients who rely on health 
monitoring apps (e.g. heart monitoring and 
blood sugar levels) as they could be given 
inaccurate information regarding their 
current state of health, whilst having their 
personal information stolen. 
Application layer 
Middleware layer 
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Naveed et al. [29] found that out of 68 smart device apps that are able to es-
tablish external device connections, not a single app had the capability to per-
form app-to-device authentication. This demonstrates the vulnerability of de-
vices connected to the organisational hub that could affect both patients and the 
network infrastructure of the organisational hub through increased risk of attack 
and exposure. 
Overall, the number of mHealth applications has increased significantly within 
the past decade and yet there is no fully developed security and privacy frame-
work to ensure data integrity and individual privacy. A clear framework could 
provide reassurances that individual privacy is preserved, while providing the 
opportunity to modify existing security and privacy policies that ensure both in-
dividual and technical protections against some of the world’s most deadly net-
work attacks. For mHealth devices, technological developments have led to the 
capability of exerting more control over these devices and applications hosted on 
the organisational hub, as well as preserve the protection of patient information. 
Thus far, the literature has identified both manned and unmanned attacks that 
can affect mHealth systems and devices, as well as the impact of IoT on the or-
ganisational hub in terms of security threats and vulnerabilities at the applica-
tion, middle-ware and sensory layers. Since there is no clear framework or risk 
assessment typology to identify potential attacks in the organisational hub, this 
paper attempts to develop a risk assessment framework to tackle this existing 
problem. But first, in order to develop this framework, there is a need to define 
the supporting methodology. 
3. Methodology 
A qualitative risk assessment methodology has been adopted in this paper. It 
demonstrates the principles to assess and evaluate information security risks 
[30] [31]. 
Qualitative Risk Analysis 
The qualitative risk assessment scores the degree of potential impact of a given 
threat e.g. high, medium or low and is able to assess all potential impacts, irre-
spective of their tangible or intangible nature. Qualitative risk analysis is there-
fore a potentially suitable methodology for the nature of the research problem as 
it utilises several interconnected elements, such as threats, vulnerabilities and 
controls [7]. OCTAVE, for example, is a specific methodology that could poten-
tially help to tackle the research problem.  
OCTAVE is a qualitative risk assessment methodology which consists of three 
phases [32]. The first involves establishing requirements or defining existing 
threats; the second involves identifying the vulnerabilities in the network infra-
structure; and the third involves the identification and prioritisation of risks, in 
addition to developing mitigating strategies to overcome or at least minimise 
threats and implementing them using the best possible methods [33] . However, 
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certain activities or criteria have to be met at each stage before moving on to the 
next to ensure that all potential threats are identified and mitigated. Therefore, 
OCTAVE is more suited to this paper as it can potentially maximise the identi-
fication and mitigation of patient hub threats and the comprehensive nature of 
the methodology ensures that a thorough risk assessment is conducted. 
The Expected Value Matrix (EVM) that OCTAVE relies on is used to deter-
mine the expected value of risk. Although the impact and probability values are 
subjective and are applied to the EVM to achieve an overall value, the method-
ology does provide a highly detailed and comprehensive risk assessment. The 
formula used to calculate loss is: Loss = Impact/Consequence × Probability. 
OCTAVE is the chosen IS risk assessment methodology to assess common 
security and privacy issues within the patient hub at the application, mid-
dle-ware and sensory layers. Figure 1 illustrates the OCTAVE process. 
Although OCTAVE is a comprehensive risk assessment methodology through 
its ability to maximise risk identification and mitigation, there is a lack of flexi-
bility which can be demonstrated through its lack of customisation. This is be-
cause OCTAVE can be adapted to align with an organisation’s requirement, but 
not all risk activities have to be mandatorily achieved, which can impact the risk 
analysis’ position of where it can fit into the methodology.  
Despite the shortfalls of OCTAVE, the methodology aligns well with the re-
search problem owing to its methodical process and ability to identify, prioritise 
and mitigate risk or network vulnerabilities early. OCTAVE can even monitor IS 
risks, which could help to identify and mitigate future risks or threats that arise 
from new technological developments. Having identified OCTAVE as the more 
suited risk assessment methodology to tackle the existing privacy and security 
threats in the patient hub, an actual risk assessment could now be conducted, 
which accounts for the application, middle-ware and sensory threats within the 
patient hub. 
 
 
Figure 1. OCTAVE process [34]. 
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4. Findings 
As stated in the previous section, the OCTAVE method was adopted to support 
the risk assessment of the vulnerabilities and threats in the patient hub at the 
application, middle-ware and sensory layers. Figure 2 illustrates a typological 
process (inspired by OCTAVE) comprising of several steps that were followed to 
perform the risk assessment.  
The steps followed (in order) are:  
1) System Characteristics; 
2) Threat Identification; 
3) Vulnerability Identification; 
4) Likelihood Determination; 
5) Impact Analysis; 
6) Risk Determination; 
7) Control Recommendations. 
4.1. Step 1: System Characterization 
The patient hub is categorised in the following groups: 
1) Hardware; 
2) Software; 
3) System Interfaces; 
4) Data; 
5) People. 
The key components of the patient hub include WSNs, gateways, Internet, 
databases and users.  
Figure 3 illustrates the patient hub architecture, which comprises of short-range 
wireless sensors, which can either be implanted or wearable devices. 
Sensors in the patient hub are development around a light vest that comprises 
of standalone non-invasive chest sensors that help to monitor COPD and 
co-morbidities. A total of 26 sensors are used and are connected to a two-wire  
 
 
Figure 2. Risk assessment process. 
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Figure 3. Patient hub system architecture & application process. 
 
Body Area Network (BAN). For diabetes patients, the patient hub includes a 
diabetes kit that has a weight scale, blood pressure meter and glucose meter. 
In terms of the middleware platform, it runs the wireless sensor network 
(WSN) on the middleware layer, which is software-based . The WSN is enhanced 
through capabilities such as d at a processing, sensor d at a mapping  and cloud 
d at a storage. The cloud database can operate internally or externally to the mid-
dleware  layer and the d at a that is transmitted to the gateway  is then transmitted 
t o the middleware where it is stored in the d at ab as e f or future access. This also 
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includes input devices that are able to access the documented data, such as mo-
bile devices, personal computers and laptops among other devices that have the 
capability of connecting to a middle-ware platform. 
On the software layer, users, such as nurses and doctors control software ap-
plications that allow access to the data stored on the database. The applications 
r un  on internet enabled devices (running on WLAN) such  as computers, l apt ops 
and smartphones. Also, people who are connected to the patient hub project  are 
often doctors  and nurses, as well as patients  and their families. Patient monitor-
ing is carried out by the medical personnel. Patients who l iv e  at home are 
equipped with a WSN (via a gateway using the 802.15.4 protocol over a wireless 
medium)  and their relatives, such as parents, children and legal guardians can 
have access to data under some legal constraints.  
The WSN that collects the sensor d at a contains information regarding pa-
tients’ health status (e.g. blood pressure) and their surroundings ( e.g. r o om 
temperature). The d at ab as e  in the middleware layer stores the sensory data, and 
patients’ records of past and present treatments  and diseases, all of which can be 
accessed via an app.  
In the patient hub, a number of assets have been  identified ranging from 
hardware to software applications. However, the patient hub considers data the 
most important asset . However, replacing hardware equipment is costly. Com-
pared to the loss of patient data, the inherent cost would be m or e  imp ort ant, 
particularly when it some down to legal compliance (such as healthcare regula-
tion), the lack of patient privacy can have  a negative  imp act  on the  organisation.  
4.2. Step 2: Threat Identification 
The next step involves the identification of threat-sources in the patient hub. A 
threat-source is essentially an event that has the potential to inflict harm on a 
system or network. Common threat-sources can be categorised as natural (e.g. 
floods and earthquakes), human (e.g. human error) and environmental (e.g. 
pollution and power-failure). Owing to the scope of this paper, which is patients’ 
use of the patient hub and the threats they face, emphasis is placed on the hu-
man threat-sources. Human threats can be either unintentional or deliberate. 
Deliberate attacks are more malicious because they are often predetermined and 
aim to intentionally attack a network or system with the intention to control the 
network and disclose personal information. Human threats can come from ei-
ther internal (e.g. medical personnel) or external (e.g. hackers and crackers) ac-
tors. In terms of the patient hub, both insider and outsider attacks can occur. 
Table 2 summarises both insider and outsider attacks that could compromise 
the patient hub. 
Although money as a motivation may result in threat actions like data 
theft ‎or ‎eavesdropping, ‎other motivational factors like unintentional errors c ‎an 
result in threats concerning ‎intrusion, ‎unauthorised system access ‎and falsified 
data. 
Figure 4 summarises the human threat-sources, their potential motivations  
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Figure 4. Threat classification. 
 
Table 2. Threat statements, motivations & actions. 
Threat-Source Motivation Threat Actions 
Insiders 
Doctors, 
nurses, 
patients 
and families 
Curiosity 
Intelligence 
Monetary gain 
Unintentional errors 
Eavesdropping 
Fraud and data theft 
Input of falsified data 
Sale of personal data 
System intrusion 
System sabotage 
Unauthorised system access 
Outsiders 
Hackers, 
companies 
and governments 
Challenge/ego 
Destruction of information 
Illegal information disclosure 
Monetary gain 
Unauthorised data modification 
Information theft 
Intrusion of privacy 
Replay, impersonation and interception 
Spoofing 
System attacks e.g. denial of service 
System intrusion 
System tampering 
Unauthorised system access 
 
and threat actions. These threat-sources can be categorised as follows:  
1) Interception: unauthorised parties gain access to protected assets; 
2) Interruption: assets are lost, unavailable or unusable; 
3) Modification: unauthorised parties gain access and tampers with assets; 
4) Fabrication: unauthorised parties fabricate counterfeit objects to exploit the 
system and its assets.  
4.3. Step 3: Vulnerability Identification 
This step involves listing all the potential system vulnerabilities that come from 
the human centric threats identified in Step 2. Security experts need to be aware 
of the latest threats and vulnerabilities and thus it is important to identify them. 
However, it is not possible to provide a list of all potential vulnerabilities for 
software components, thus the rationale for focussing mainly on human threats.  
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Within the WSN are sensors that broadcast data via a wireless medium. Sen-
sors have a smaller transmission range than traditional wireless devices owing to 
their weaker transmission power. Regardless of whether the threat-source is in-
ternal or external, they are equipped with an antenna to capture the data trans-
mitted between sensors that are in clear transmission range. Therefore, antennas 
can create a vulnerability in the form of data theft.  
Given that sensor nodes can be assessed physically in a hospital or a patients’ 
home, they are more open to malicious entities that aim to steal (e.g. denial of 
service attack), insert (e.g. spoofing) or even destroy (e.g. sabotage) the sensors. 
As soon as an attacker has physical access to the sensor, they have the power to 
copy, modify and place software on new sensor nodes that can capture (e.g. data 
theft) or insert (e.g. sabotage) the forged data and make it look like a legitimate 
transaction. Sensors also have other constraints, such as limited battery power. 
Outside attackers prey on this vulnerability by exploiting the sensor to deplete a 
device’s battery and this can be achieved through a denial of service attack. 
Therefore, the sensors become unresponsive as they rely on the device’s battery 
power to function. 
Viruses and Trojan horses are other attacks that enable attackers to access a 
database. If a database that is hosted on a server is physically accessible, the data 
can be easily exploited and compromised (e.g. copying private data). Vulner-
abilities of this nature can be exploited for the modification, fabrication and theft 
of data and for infiltrating a network. Moreover, this is a gateway and mid-
dle-ware vulnerability since the data is transmitted from nodes to users without 
any protective measures. Therefore, these attacks exploit the confidentiality and 
integrity of sensory data (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Summary of system vulnerabilities & associated threat-sources & actions. 
Vulnerability Threat-Source Threat-Action 
Vulnerability 1: 
Sensor broadcast data 
on the wireless medium 
Any internal 
or external entity 
Data Theft, 
Intrusion on privacy 
Vulnerability 2: 
Sensor nodes are physically 
accessible and not tamper resistant 
Any internal 
or external entity 
Destruction of sensors, 
Stealing sensors. Insert new sensors, 
Capture data, 
Spoofing, Generate false data 
Vulnerability 3: 
Sensors are restricted devices 
External entity Denial of Service 
Vulnerability 4: 
Data is stored in a database 
without means of encryption 
Any internal 
or external entity 
Data Theft, Intrusion on privacy, 
System intrusion, 
Destruction of data, 
Modification and Fabrication of data 
Vulnerability 5: 
Data is transported through the 
System without encryption measures 
Any internal 
or external entity 
Data Theft, Destruction, 
Modification, Fabrication, 
Intrusion on privacy 
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4.4. Step 4: Likelihood Determination 
This step involves the evaluation of the likelihood that an attacker exploits a 
vulnerability. Scores of high, medium and low are given to measure the likeli-
hood of a vulnerability from a threat-source. The attacker’s motivation, capacity 
and the effectiveness of existing controls helps to determine the likelihood level 
of a given threat-source. Table 4 summarises the three likelihood levels. 
Furthermore, the European Directive 95/46/EC protects individual data (in-
cluding healthcare data) by imposing protective rules for the autonomous proc-
essing, managing and distribution of data through sensors. Organisations are 
obligated to comply with the European Directive’s regulations since the sensor 
data is a value asset. Using Table 4, a rating can be given to the vulnerabilities 
stated in step 4 and summarised in Table 4. 
Antenna equipped with wave capturing technology is a hardware resource 
that enables attackers to eavesdrop on a system or network. Antennas are cheap 
or can be homemade with very little technical experience required to make 
them, making it one of the most efficient ways to exploit a network vulnerability. 
For example, the antenna attached to a device, such as a laptop enables the at-
tacker to stand outside of a patient’s home and secretly collect the information 
from the sensors. Given the cost effectiveness of implementing this vulnerability 
suggests the likelihood would be high.  
Sensory attacks often require attackers to be physically close to the nodes and 
the nature of the threat-source determines how challenging the implementation 
of this vulnerability will be. Potential internal threat sources, such as social aid 
workers and relatives will often have a key to the patient’s home or in a hospital 
scenario easy access to wards, adds to the trivialness of entering these settings. 
On the other hand, external attackers will have to illegally enter the premises and 
the difficulty of this depends on the setting, e.g. easier to sneak or break into a 
hospital as there are no alarms compared to a patients’ home that could be 
rigged with a burglar alarm. In addition to entering the premises, the attacker 
must have strong technical knowledge about tampering with sensor nodes. 
Therefore, the likelihood of this vulnerability is medium as it depends on the at-
tacker’s technical proficiency and physical proximity. 
A threat-source with a strong understanding of wireless devices and equip-
ment is needed to exploit a sensory based vulnerability. Sensors that process 
signals from only trusted sources are potential controls that could be used to 
mitigate this vulnerability. Therefore, the likelihood of this vulnerability is low 
on the basis that the attack requires specialist knowledge and skills. 
 
Table 4. Likelihood threat levels. 
Likelihood Level Description 
High Threat-source is highly motivated and sufficiently capable 
Medium Threat-source is motivated and capable 
Low Threat-source lack motivation or capability 
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The most vital and sensitive part of a system is data and is the reason why 
most attackers will focus on data that is held in databases. Methods that grant 
access to the database could be exploited to manipulate and destroy data, such as 
installing Trojan horses and viruses and even human error e.g. sharing pass-
words and installing malicious programs. Therefore, the likelihood of risk will be 
high as data is a valuable asset that can be used to expose people, obtain financial 
data and even patients’ medical records, which attackers will prey upon. 
Each component of a system can be used to perform attacks and compromise 
data through data theft and corruption. Existing communication channels offer 
very limited mechanisms to preserve data confidentiality and integrity, thus giv-
ing attackers the opportunity to eavesdrop between two internal systems com-
ponents e.g. the gateway and middle-ware layer. Therefore, the likelihood of this 
vulnerability is high since an attacker can anywhere in the system and has multi-
ple methods of performing attacks. 
4.5. Step 5: Impact Analysis 
The fifth step involves the determination of the adverse impacts resulting from 
vulnerabilities that have been successfully exploited. Similar to the likelihood 
scale, impact is also measured as high, medium or low. This helps to determine 
the risk levels for all identified vulnerabilities in step 4 through comparing the 
likelihood ratings against the impact analysis. Since the emphasis of this paper is 
on the data transmitted through the Patient Hub, only data-related vulnerabili-
ties are measured. Table 5 summarises the impact categories. 
A loss of confidentiality in patients’ private data can arise from exploiting this 
vulnerability. Disclosing private medical data can lead to a loss of public confi-
dence or individuals filing lawsuits against organisation as the regulations that 
are supposed to protect their data have been breached. With no security meas-
ures that can preserve data confidentiality and integrity, it can be difficult to gain 
users’ acceptance of technology, thus resulting in a high impact of vulnerability. 
Sensor nodes that are either stolen, destroyed or inserted can cause a number 
of problems, such as the integration of fake or false data and inaccessible sensory 
data. A loss of integrity and confidentiality can arise from the successful exploi-
tation of this vulnerability e.g. destruction of sensory nodes prevents data trans-
fer or rogue sensors transmitting data to the attacker. Monetary and cost im-
pacts can also arise from stolen or destroyed nodes as they would need to be re-
placed. Therefore, the impact level of this vulnerability is high owing to the dis-
ruption it could bring to an organisation or individual. 
 
Table 5. Impact levels description. 
Impact Level Description 
High Vulnerability could lead to loss of major assets or patient death or injury 
Medium 
Vulnerability could lead to a moderate loss of assets and medium risk 
or injury or death 
Low 
Vulnerability could lead to a minimal loss of assets and very 
little chance of injury or death 
M. B. Ali et al. 
 
 
DOI: 10.4236/cn.2020.122003 55 Communications and Network 
 
Unavailability of data and the transmission of corrupt data can arise from the 
battery exhaustion of a sensor. As soon as the sensor is running low on power 
due to a low battery, data accuracy is impeded. LEDs showing the battery level 
and sounds to indicate low battery power on a device are considered controls to 
prompt users to charge their device. Therefore, the impact of this vulnerability 
will be medium since low battery power leading to data interruptions can be 
quickly detected and mitigated. 
Attackers who gain access to a database are able to steal, modify, insert and 
destroy the data stored within it. This vulnerability would again lead to further 
data integrity, confidentiality and integrity issues. This is because, for example, 
when an attacker eavesdrops on a wireless channel at a hospital, they will have 
full access to all patient data, which only they can manipulate. For that reason, 
the impact of this vulnerability will be high owing to the attacker’s full access to 
patient data which they could disclose or sell. 
A loss of data confidentiality and integrity can also arise from data having no 
protective measures, such as a VPN or firewall. Eavesdropping and the tamper-
ing of system components (e.g. middle-ware, gateway and sensors) is made easy 
without a firewall as attackers would be able to access a system that a decent 
firewall would have been capable of preventing. Therefore, the level of impact of 
this vulnerability will be high owing to a loss of the most valuable asset to a firm 
or individual, which is their data. 
4.6. Step 6: Risk Determination 
In step 6, an assessment of the level of risk to the analysed system is performed. 
This is measured based on the idea that a risk is function of the likelihood of a 
threat-source successfully exploiting a vulnerability and the degree of impact in 
the event of that exploit occurring. Risk levels are calculated by taking the likeli-
hood and impact ratings and multiplying them together. Table 6 summarises 
how the risk levels are calculated based on both the likelihood and impact rat-
ings (low, medium and high). The risk level leads to a subjective interpretation 
of the risk outcome, which is part of the qualitative risk assessment procedure 
owing to its highly descriptive nature. 
 
Table 6. Risk level matrix: High (6 - 10), Medium (1 - 5) & Low (0.1 to 1). 
Threat Likelihood 
Impact 
Low (1) Medium (5) High (10) 
High 
Low 
1.0 × 1 = 1 
Medium 
1.0 × 5 = 5 
High 
1.0 × 10 = 10 
Medium 
Low 
0.5 × 1 = 0.5 
Medium 
0.5 × 5 = 2.5 
Medium 
0.5 × 10 = 5 
Low 
Low 
0.1 × 1 = 0.1 
Low 
0.1 × 5 = 0.5 
Low 
0.1 × 10 = 1 
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OCTAVE can help to avoid any confusion regarding the probabilities for the 
likelihood and impact levels. For the likelihood levels, each are given a level of 
1.0 for high, 0.5 for medium and 0.1 for low. For the impact levels, each are 
given a level of 10 for high, 5 for medium and 1 for low. Table 6 outlines the re-
sulting matrix, 0.1 - 1 being low, 1 - 5 being medium and 6 - 10 being high. 
Table 7 summarises each risk level. 
The risk level matrix helped to identify and determine the risk levels for each 
vulnerability. The resulting matrix illustrated in Table 6 shows that the level of 
risk in vulnerability 3 is low, a medium risk for vulnerability 2 and vulnerabili-
ties 1, 4 and 5 represent the highest risk. For that reason, the seventh and final 
step recommends risk controls and mitigations. 
4.7. Step 7: Control Recommendations 
The previous steps identified a number of potential risks to the patient hub. This 
calls for countermeasures to mitigate these risks that aim to prevent or at least 
minimise the likelihood of risk occurrence, impact or both. Figure 5 illustrates 
the risk description based on the likelihood and impact of risk occurrence. 
Vulnerability 3 which represents power restrictions in sensory devices is con-
sidered a low risk. Although users can overcome this risk through the trivial task 
of monitoring the device’s battery power, providing additional countermeasures 
can be problematic owing the restrictions on sensors being inherent to the actual 
nodes. 
 
 
Figure 5. Risk description based on likelihood x impact of risk. 
 
Table 7. Risk description. 
Risk Level Risk Description & Necessary Action 
High 
If an observation is assessed as high risk, correct measures are significantly 
required and corrective planning must be made as soon as possible 
Medium 
If an observation is assessed as medium risk, correct measures are moderately 
required and corrective planning must be made in a reasonable time frame 
Low 
If an observation is assessed as low risk, a decision has to be make whether 
corrective measures are required 
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Vulnerability 2 which represents the physical accessibility and tampering of 
sensor nodes is considered a medium risk. Similar to the low risks, there are very 
limited technical controls that can be used to mitigate this risk as it is based on 
the attackers’ varying knowledge and skills of exploiting networks and systems, 
thus making it difficult to create a universal countermeasure. Alternatively, 
training patients about indoor security and installing a burglar alarm could help 
to reduce this risk. 
Vulnerabilities 1, 4 and 5 represent a high risk. Sensory data could be pro-
tected against loss of integrity and confidentiality between the system compo-
nents such as sensors, gateways and middle-ware layers, through data encryption 
in the WSN. However, these controls can only partly reduce the risks associated 
with the vulnerabilities 4 and 5 because these security measures cannot prevent 
data theft or modification if the system components are compromised. In other 
words, irrespective of all communication channels being secure, if a single com-
ponent is malicious, the data remains insecure. 
Mitigating the risk of vulnerabilities 1, 4 and 5 requires a security scheme that 
relies on cryptography, which provides endless data confidentiality from sensor 
nodes to data users. Also, given that the security challenge of the patient hub is 
huge, particularly in the application, middle-ware and sensory layers of the data 
cloud. The countermeasure here centers on the location of the patients sensitive 
data. For organisations that use the system, they will have its own unique hub 
and therefore will have a separate local database for storing sensitive data. Re-
garding the security of these databases, authorisation and authentication is 
needed by encrypting the access token of the system, which is stored in the local 
storage. In addition, HTTPS and VPN can be used to communicate between 
user applications, the patient hub and the cloud for additional protection. An 
SSL10 certificate can be used by the server to secure the data via encryption, thus 
enabling communication through an encrypted and secure channel.  
4.8. Summary of Findings 
According to these findings, the security of sensory data is lacking and no such 
framework exists to countermeasure this problem. Since existing security meas-
ures are failing to mitigate the risks, the preservation of security through the se-
cure integration of wireless sensory networks in healthcare applications is a 
more suitable solution. This ensures that sensory data is protected against the 
unwarranted disclosure of data and loss of confidentiality among users. 
Previously, a risk analysis of the patient hub was performed using the 
OCTAVE methodology. Despite the thorough risk assessment that was con-
ducted, it was conducted via qualitative reasoning, meaning that the risk out-
comes were based on subjectivity and predictions. In order to obtain a more ob-
jective risk assessment (based on likelihood and impact of risk), future studies 
could place more emphasis on statistical data. Though, theoretical findings sug-
gest that statistics regarding the vulnerabilities in wireless sensory networks are 
scarce. Although previous studies have recommended countermeasures for 
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WSNs, they very rarely consider the likelihood and impact of sensory attacks. 
Overall, there is a need to preserve confidentiality and integrity of sensory data 
through the introduction of a cryptographic security scheme. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper aimed to identify and mitigate potential security risks in mHealth 
systems, namely the patient hub. Through an analysis of security impacts of 
mHealth systems, it was found that the security vision of the patient hub of us-
ing ubiquitous remote patient monitoring raises a number of security problems. 
To address the research problem, the inherent risks of the patient hub were 
identified via the OCTAVE risk assessment methodology. Data exposure was 
found to constitute the highest risk. Integrating WSNs in the patient hub was 
found to provide a good solution to preserve data integrity and confidentiality. 
Future research implications include studying the inherent risks of the patient 
hub using alternative risk assessment methodologies. These include: the Security 
Risk Management Discipline (SRMD), COSEO Risk Management Framework, 
ISO31000 series and the NIST Risk Management Framework. These frameworks 
could be used to replicate a similar process to the one presented in our findings 
to reveal any similarities and differences in their results. 
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